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Abstract In this article I re-examine the tenets of the transformative paradigm as ex-
plained by Mertens in various publications. Mertens suggests that the transformative
paradigm (as she names it) encapsulates the positions of researchers who question
positivist/postpositivist- and interpretivist/constructivist-oriented approaches, which to
date have been ascendant in the field of social research. She argues (following critical
theorists) that researchers embracing a transformative paradigm as an alternative explicitly
bear social justice issues in mind so that their inquiries become intertwined with a political
agenda and are action-oriented towards generating increased fairness in the social fabric. In
the article I consider her arguments and I add additional angles to them with reference to a
number of authors (including myself) advocating critical systemic thinking-and-practice
and advocating Indigenous systemic approaches. I consider some implications of the re-
vised understanding of the transformative paradigm (and its relationship to ‘‘other’’
paradigms) for operating as a researcher.
Keywords Transformative paradigm  Systemic research practice  Postcolonial
Indigenous paradigm  Action-oriented research  Active research
Introduction
This article begins with a discussion of Mertens’ argument regarding research paradigms,
and in particular the transformative paradigm, which she has named and elucidated in
various publications. She suggests that at present ‘‘no unified body of literature is repre-
sentative of the transformative paradigm’’, but there are various characteristics ‘‘which are
common to the diverse perspectives represented within it and serve to distinguish it from
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the postpositivist and constructivist paradigms’’ (2010a, p. 21). She sets out to explicate
and to further spell out/develop) these characteristics. In this article I discuss her expli-
cation of the transformative paradigm with reference to her views on ontology, episte-
mology, methodology and axiology and the links between them within this paradigm. I
indicate that in different writings she offers somewhat different emphases, but her overall
purpose is to explore what ‘‘transformative’’ might mean in the context of research.
Mertens defines the transformative paradigm by drawing on and adapting various authors’
typologies, such as those supplied by Lather (1992) and Lincoln and Guba (2003), where
distinctions are made between emancipatory approaches (which she re-names as trans-
formative) and positivist/postpositivist-oriented, and interpretive/constructivist-oriented
approaches. (She also singles out a transformative versus pragmatic use of ‘‘mixed
methods’’, adding pragmatism to Lincoln and Guba’s typology.)
In the course of the article I introduce arguments offered by a number of critical
systemic thinkers, whose theory-and-practice is also (like hers) inspired by the critical
theoretical tradition. I deliberately hyphernate theory-and-practice here to point to what
Ivanov calls the ‘‘systemic idea of the relationship between theory and praxis in which the
two are inseparable’’ (2011, p. 498). I show how this way of understanding critical sys-
temic research means that knowing processes are not seen as separable from the con-
tinuing unfolding of social and ecological life (where everything is seen as fundamentally
connected). I relate these arguments to those of certain authors proposing the need to
feature Indigenous views on systems and on research more strongly as a way of de-
colonizing research practice and effecting transformation accordingly. I then consider how
all of these approaches offer views on how one can engage in research by being more
cognisant of its ‘‘active’’ component. I indicate that action-oriented research need not
necessarily mean following the traditional action research cycle. I conclude with some
considerations around including additional paradigms into typologies of what are under-
stood to be the ‘‘major’’ paradigms (as Mackenzie and Knipe put it), as set out in Table 1.
Mertens’ Explication of the Transformative Paradigm
Mertens indicates that she understands ‘‘transformative theory’’ as an umbrella term that
encompasses paradigmatic perspectives that are meant to be emancipatory, participatory,
and inclusive (1999, p. 4). She states that ‘‘the transformative paradigm is characterized as
placing central importance on the lives and experiences of marginalized groups, such as
women, ethnic/racial minorities, people with disabilities, and those who are poor’’. When
embracing this paradigm, efforts are made by inquirers to ‘‘link the results of social inquiry
to action, and [to] link the results of the inquiry to wider questions of social inequity and
social justice’’ (1999, p. 4).1
In order to spell out further the qualities of the transformative paradigm, she refers to its
underlying ontological, epistemological and methodological orientations. She elucidates
that ‘‘the transformative paradigm is based on ontological, epistemological and method-
ological assumptions that are different from those underlying the postpositivist and in-
terpretive/constructivist world views’’ (1999, p. 4). (She prefers to speak of postpositivist
views as these are more sophisticated arguments which have developed, and which do not
1 Mertens is here placing her discussion in the context of doing research toward program evaluation—but
her statements can be seen as applying to all forms of research as she questions the distinction between
‘‘evaluation’’ and ‘‘research’’ (1999, p. 5).
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presuppose that any statements about reality can become verified—rather it is recognized
that knowledge is always provisional.2) She outlines the differences between these para-
digms as follows.
She states (1999) that within a transformative paradigm the ontological question, ‘‘What
is the nature of reality and by extension, truth?’’ is not answered (as in postpositivism) by
assuming that we have some access to it via processes of science; nor is it answered (as in
constructivism) by asserting that there are multiple realities that are constructed in pro-
cesses of living and knowing. Rather, the ontological question is answered by ‘‘placing
various viewpoints within a political, cultural, and economic value system to understand
the basis for the differences’’—so as to understand how certain perspectives on reality
become privileged over others (1999, p. 5). How specific constructions of reality come to
be given more weight in society and how researchers can serve to undercut undue
privileging of views, are the (ontological) concerns of the transformative researcher.
As far as epistemology goes, she argues that the question of what ‘‘knowing’’ amounts to
is not answered by claiming (as in postpositivism) that the quest for objectivity (observing
from a somewhat distant and dispassionate standpoint) can lead to increased knowledge,
nor by simply asserting that the interaction between researchers and participants generates
the constructions that are developed in the research process (as in forms of interpre-
tivism/constructivism). In the transformative paradigm the manner in which researchers
relate with participants such that a fair understanding of key viewpoints is created and
such that the power of the researcher to frame questions does not overpower the ‘‘results’’
is considered as crucial (1999, p. 5).
Methodologically, Mertens states that the postpositivist paradigm is characterized as
‘‘using primarily quantitative methods that are decontextualized’’ (as the dominant
Table 1 Paradigms: language commonly associated with major research paradigms
Positivist/postpositivist Interpretivist/constructivist Transformative Pragmatic
Experimental
Quasi-experimental
Correlational
Reductionism
Theory verification
Causal comparative
Determination
Naturalistic
Phenomenological
Hermeneutic
Interpretivist
Ethnographic
Multiple participant
meanings
Social and historical
construction
Theory generation
Symbolic interaction
Critical theory
Neo-marxist
Feminist
Critical Race Theory
Freirean
Participatory
Emancipatory
Advocacy
Grand Narrative
Empowerment issue
oriented
Change-oriented
Interventionist
Queer theory
Race specific
Political
Consequences of
actions
Problem-centred
Pluralistic
Real-world practice
oriented
Mixed models
Mackenzie and Knipe had an additional term ‘‘Normative’’ in the first column, but I have removed it as I
regard it as somewhat out of place—given that positivism/postpositivism holds that scientists should strive
for value-freedom (objectivity) in the research process
Source: McKenzie and Knipe, 2006, p. 195 (http://www.iier.org.au/iier16/mackenzie.html) (Adapted from
Creswell, 2003, and Mertens, 2005)
2 She states that this can otherwise be called the ‘‘scientific method paradigm’’ (1999, p. 4).
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methods to which it accords most status). The interpretive/constructivist paradigm is
‘‘characterized as using primarily qualitative methods in a hermeneutical… manner (to aid
the interpretation of meanings as expressed by participants). These are its principal
methods, which are given more status in the research endeavor to add depth to the in-
vestigation. Mertens suggests that what is specific about the transformative paradigm is
that it might involve quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods3—but the community that
is most impacted by the research needs to be ‘‘involved to some degree in the method-
ological decisions’’. She therefore argues that what is important methodologically is that
when conducting research underpinned by a transformative paradigm, researchers confer
with key participants in defining which method(s) to use (and how). She cites, for instance,
a project where researchers used a strategy that ‘‘involved surveying disabled people
before conducting a survey to determine the effectiveness of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act’’. She indicates that:
We used their responses in constructing both the design and the survey instruments,
recognizing—based on what we had learned from them—the need to ask probing
questions of business owners and operators not just about observable barriers, but
also about invisible ones, such as whether a blind person with a guide dog might be
refused entry to a cafe or restaurant. (1999, p. 10)
She cites another example, of how, in a court access project where she was one of the
researchers:
We designed the data collection forms with an eye towards facilitating transfor-
mative change. As part of the training programs for judges and other court personnel,
we invited deaf and hard of hearing people and their advocates to attend the training
workshops with representatives of the court systems in their state [with a focus on
creating action plans]. (1999, p. 11)
The research thus proceeded from initial data collection via forms which were designed
with key participants (from the deaf and hard of hearing communities), to the holding of
action-oriented workshops, which were co-designed with court personnel and representa-
tives of the deaf and hard of hearing) so as to make ‘‘plans for future actions’’ (1999, p. 11):
with the (initiating) researchers not shying from setting up participative change-oriented
inquiry processes where consideration/exploration of future options were seen as part of
the inquiry process.
In later writings (e.g. 2007a, b, 2010a, b, 2012) Mertens elaborates on her understanding
of ontological epistemological and methodological assumptions of the transformative
paradigm and on the link between these various assumptions. She also adds, following
Lincoln and Guba (2003, p. 265) the axiological question (alongside ontology, episte-
mology and methodology). Lincoln and Guba point out that they added axiology into their
layout of paradigms in order to ‘‘make values (the branch of philosophy dealing with
ethics, aesthetics and religion) a part of the basic foundational philosophical dimension of
paradigm proposal’’ (p. 265). This, they propose, enables us to better identify critical
theorists’ concern with ‘‘liberation from oppression and freeing of the human spirit, [which
are] both profoundly spiritual concerns’’ (p. 265). That is, by adding into the discussion of
paradigms researchers’ views on ways in which values enter (if at all) into processes of
3 Mertens qualifies this by stating that ‘‘mixed methods designs that use both quantitative and qualitative
methods can be used in any paradigm; however, the underlying assumptions [that researchers are bringing to
bear] determine which paradigm is operationalized’’ (1999, p. 5).
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social inquiry, we are better equipped to understand various researchers’ positions on this
score. Now Mertens argues that as far as ethical issues are concerned, the transformative
paradigm exhorts researchers to make ‘‘an explicit connection… between the process and
outcomes of research and furtherance of a social justice agenda’’ (2007a, p. 216). This, for
her, is not a matter of showing a commitment to University Institutional Review Board
requirements, where the focus is on matters such as ensuring informed consent of par-
ticipants, ensuring that they are aware of their right to withdraw, ensuring that concerns
with not harming them will be taken into account, etc. (2009, pp. 222–223). It goes much
further than this and requires that active quests to further social justice are accommodated
within the research agenda.
With this understanding of ethical accountability, she argues indeed (2010b, p. 470) that
‘‘the axiological belief is of primary importance in the transformative paradigm and drives
the formulation of the three other belief systems (ontology, epistemology and method-
ology)’’. Or, otherwise put, ‘‘the axiological assumption provides a conceptual framework
from which the other assumptions of the paradigm logically flow’’ (2012, p. 811). She also
makes the point that although some authors associate mixed-method research with a
‘‘pragmatic paradigm’’ and use ‘‘pragmatism’’ to philosophically justify their use of more
than one method, she herself prefers to use a transformative paradigm as philosophical
basis for mixed-method use. This then requires researchers to consider how the use of
mixed methods might serve the ends of social justice (2010a, p. 8). (Flood and Romm
similarly observe that often in practice with pragmatism as an approach, options may be
united eclectically on the grounds that it ‘‘seems to work’’ to unite them, but ‘‘theoretical
reasoning around the claim that ‘this works’ is limited’’—see 1996a, p. 589. Mertens’
suggestion is that an axiological basis where an ethic of justice prevails would provide the
grounding for deciding—with participants—choices of method and how to use the dif-
ferent methods.)
When discussing ontology in her article on the transformative paradigm (2007a),
Mertens expands on her earlier (1999) account and suggests that ‘‘transformative re-
searchers need to be aware of societal values and privileges in determining the reality that
holds potential for social transformation and increased social justice’’ (2007a, p. 216). She
suggests that what counts as ‘‘reality’’ for transformative researchers is therefore what
definitions (constructions) can be said to have most leverage in effecting change towards
increased justice. She elaborates that
the ontological assumption of the transformative paradigm holds that reality is so-
cially constructed, but it does so with a conscious awareness that certain individuals
occupy a position of greater power and that individuals with other characteristics
may be associated with a higher likelihood of exclusion from decisions about the
definition of the research focus, questions, and other methodological aspects of the
inquiry. (2007a, p. 216)
Put differently, she suggests that those embracing a transformative paradigm concede
(with constructivists) that reality is socially constructed, but try to ensure that ‘‘exclusions’’
of the less powerful in construing ways of defining issues are not unduly perpetuated via
the research process. Interestingly, in further explicating the ontological tenet of the
transformative paradigm (2010b), she offers a somewhat different approach, in order to
distinguish her argument from constructivism. Here she suggests that:
The transformative ontological assumption recognizes that there are many versions
of what is considered to be real and is cognizant of the constructivists’ discussion of
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the social construction of multiple realities. Yet it diverges from this belief in that it
holds that there is one reality about which there are multiple opinions. (2010b,
p. 470, my italics)
She asserts that one can and should still posit a reality—even though we have no access
to it but only to multiple opinions about it. I will return later (critically) to this account of
hers—when discussing the suggestion put forward by various critical systemic thinkers that
in a systemic worldview (ontology) there is no attempt to uphold an ontological dualism
between ‘‘observer’’ and ‘‘observed’’ (so-called external realities).
In discussing implications for epistemology in her article on the transformative para-
digm (2007a), she elucidates her position as follows:
To know realities, it is necessary to have an interactive link between the researcher
and the participants in a study. Knowledge is socially and historically located within
a complex cultural context. (2007a, p. 216)
Here she uses the term ‘‘know’’ implying that some kind of ‘‘knowledge’’ can be
attained as long as one enters into a dialogical relationship with participants—but she also
points out that ‘‘knowledge is socially located’’—implying that it is a constructed product.
Again, I return to this later in the article (when discussing certain Indigenous authors’
arguments concerning the social construction of reality during knowing processes).
As far as methodology is concerned, she expands on her earlier works as follows:
A researcher can choose quantitative or qualitative or mixed methods, but there
should be an interactive link between the researcher and the participants in the
definition of the problem, methods should be adjusted to accommodate cultural
complexity, power issues should be explicitly addressed, and issues of discrimination
and oppression should be recognized. (2007a, p. 216)
She underscores that transformative researchers take care to work together with research
participants when choosing appropriate methods—but she emphasizes more strongly (than
in her earlier works) that the prime participants to which researchers should feel allegiance
are those who are dealing with the brunt of ‘‘issues of discrimination and oppression’’
(2007a, p. 216). This concurs with her account in her article on transformative consid-
erations (2007b), where she notes that the axiological assumption in the transformative
paradigm ‘‘leads to an awareness of the need to redress inequalities by giving precedence,
or at least equal weight, to the voice of the least advantaged groups in society’’ (2007b,
p. 86, my italics). She expands further on this (with what can be said to be a different
emphasis again) when noting (2010b) that:
The transformative belief systems discussed thus far [axiology, ontology and epis-
temology] lead to methodological beliefs about appropriate ways to gather data about
the reality of a concept in such a way that we have confidence that we have indeed
captured the reality in an ethical manner and that has potential to lead to the
enhancement of social justice. (2010b, p. 472, my italics)
She refers to ‘‘capturing the reality in an ethical manner’’—arguing that such a ‘‘cap-
turing’’ can be defined by its potential to enhance social justice. Her use of the word
capture is somewhat ambiguous, though. If one concedes that understandings of ‘‘reality’’
are not neutral (and are imbued with ethical concerns), then the word capture here can
(better) be interpreted as meaning that one is not presuming to grasp some posited reality,
but is working towards generating what one understands—with others—as a defined
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increase in justice. This is the point made by critical systemic thinkers (as well as others
reflecting on the nature of research and its impact in society) to which I turn later.
Returning to Mertens’ argument, she notes that axiological assumptions in the con-
structivist paradigm also are giving rise to more ‘‘leaders in the field’’ citing the ‘‘need to
situate their work in social justice’’ (2010a, p. 21). She refers to self-named constructivists
who refer to the doing of research in ‘‘ways that are both respectful of the human relations
between researchers and participants … [and aimed at] enhancing the furthering of social
justice from the research’’ (2010a, p. 18). Mertens sees this ‘‘shift in constructivist
scholarship’’ as ‘‘as indicator of the permeability of paradigmatic boundaries’’ (2010a,
p. 21). But what Mertens does not highlight is the constructivist argument that social
realities can be said to be formed (and not just ‘‘found/captured’’) via the process of
research (at the moment of doing research) as explained, for example, in Romm (1996,
2001a, b, 2002, 2010). In the next section I turn to this issue through the lens of the
writings of certain critical systemic thinkers/researchers, who focus on the way in which
worlds are ‘‘brought forth’’ via the languaging between humans (Bawden, 2011, p. 4).
Bawden summarizes this (critical systemic) argument thus:
If we are to bring forth … different worlds as a function of a quest to transform the
way we live our collective lives … we will need to modify the epistemes [ways of
knowing and living] that come to dominate the modernist culture. If our intercon-
nectivities and inter-relationships with those in other [less modernist-oriented] cul-
tures as well as with the rest of nature are to be developed in a manner that is
sustainable, defensible, responsible and inclusive, we will need to establish epis-
temes that are appropriate to the task. (2011, pp. 4–5)
Bawden highlights that ‘‘appropriate’’ knowing is a matter of recognizing how our
languaging constructs and creates worlds which are in processes of becoming, and on the
basis of this recognition, taking some responsibility for the way in which we bring forth
worlds (with others). That is, just because knowing necessarily creates an intervention
(albeit that this may be more or less recognized by people and within cultures), it is
incumbent upon us to consider carefully the values that are being brought to bear when
bringing forth different worlds. This, I would argue, is the crux of critical systemic thinking
and practice as explained below.
Critical Systemic Thinking and Practice
As mentioned earlier, Ivanov indicates that in a critical systemic approach—with the
emphasis on systemic rather than on systems—‘‘the systemic idea of the relationship
between theory and practice’’ is borne in mind by those practicing such an approach
(2011, p. 498). He cites Midgley as making it clear that in some sense it is the critical
systemic researchers’ ideology and ethical stance that determines the choosing of
methodologies (with chosen participants) and the choosing of goals with participants (such
as improvements towards social justice). Before explaining this argument, I will first
briefly explain Midgley’s (1996) summary of the commitments of Critical Systems
Thinking (CST) as developed by those naming and developing it as a distinct systems
approach, namely Flood and Jackson (1991). Midgley summarizes that according to Flood
and Jackson those practicing CST can be seen to embrace the following three
commitments:
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• Critical awareness—examining and reexamining taken-for-granted assumptions, along
with the conditions that gave rise to them;
• Emancipation—ensuring that research is focused on ‘‘improvement’’, defined tem-
porarily and locally, taking issues of power (which may affect the definition) into
account;
• Methodological pluralism—using a variety of research methods in a theoretically
coherent manner, becoming aware of their strengths and weaknesses, to address a
corresponding variety of issues. (Midgley, 1996, p. 11)
We can see from this summary that these commitments bear similarity to Mertens’
discussion of the orientation of what she calls ‘‘transformative scholars’’ (1999, p. 1) to:
• re-examine assumptions (and re-examine the privileging of certain views and
approaches that have become entrenched in society);
• orient research to creating improvements towards more social justice; and
• use mixed method research not merely in a pragmatic manner but in a manner
consistent with a critical theoretical transformative approach.
Midgley notes, though, that apart from the commitments which supposedly define CST,
there is no consensually accepted definition of the nature of the commitments, which are
spelled out differently by different authors who self-label themselves as CST proponents
(1996, p, 12). He suggests also that further to the original writings of Flood and Jackson
(1991), they can be said to have each shifted their positions—for example, he sees the book
by Flood and Romm (1996b) as one instance of such a shift (Midgley, 1996, p. 12). He also
argues that new/alternative ways of conceptualizing CST were already germinating in, for
example, Midgley (1990), Flood (1990), and Gregory (1992). What I would like to focus
on here is the ‘‘shift’’ towards recognizing the impact of ways of knowing (and framing of
issues/problems) on the unfolding of ‘‘systems’’. Midgley notes that from his experience,
when relating with participants as a systemic researcher, ‘‘many people welcome the
chance to look at how the problem they have identified interfaces with others, and ap-
preciate systemic logic’’ (1996, p. 21).
Reviewing the Transformative Paradigm: Emphasizing our Impact (as Knowers) on
Emergent ‘‘Realities’’
What seems to me is not sufficiently highlighted in Mertens’ explication of the trans-
formative paradigm is the requirement for us to appreciate that ‘‘knowing’’ itself exerts an
impact on the ‘‘realities’’ to be ‘‘known’’—that is, on their manner of unfolding. When
Mertens states (2010b) that the transformative paradigm asserts that there is one reality
(even though we may not be able to access it) I would suggest that she does not sufficiently
accentuate how the process of knowing already can be said to have impacts at the moment
of ‘‘doing research’’ (cf. Romm, 1995, 1996). Hence researchers working within this
perspective are called upon to recognize that ‘‘knowing’’ generates an intervention in
defining the direction that social (and ecological) systems might develop (with knowing
being part of these systems, as noted also by Bawdens, 2011).4 It is for this reason that it is
incumbent on us to try to consciously intervene in a justifiable and responsible way. This
idea is also expressed by Eser when he refers to what he calls justified intervention (which
4 It is worth mentioning here that I have added the word ecological systems because Midgley (1996, p. 21)
is concerned that the term human emancipation as often used within CST and other critical theoretical texts
might deprioritize our thinking around ecological well-being—or what McIntyre-Mills terms social and
ecological justice (2008, 2014). It is not clear to what extent Mertens too takes ecological considerations into
account when speaking about social justice.
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is dialogically based, and which involves considering with others how our languaging
affects the ‘‘outcomes’’ that arise through the way we speak and act—2014, p. 379). Or as
Ali summarizes this concern:
If we are to have confidence in our research we need the to be constantly aware of
how this research impacts on others …. Concerns about impact are less obvious
when researching with objects [non-humans] although of course this need not be the
case. (2010, p. 246)
Bishop and Shepherd (2011) add a caveat to this, though, when they note that it is not
necessarily clear, either in advance or in hindsight, what kinds of effects our research
endeavors might have. As they state in relation to research in the social arena, ‘‘we cannot
know or articulate the effect we have on others (which changes depending on the person)’’.
Even though we do know that self-biographies and concerns that researchers introduce
when doing research will make some difference to the ‘‘outcomes’’ we cannot know in
exactly what way this will be the case—but nor can we ‘‘evade [our] influence’’ (2011,
p. 1290).
In his book on Systemic Intervention (2000), Midgley indicates why this argument can
be considered as systemic at root (in contrast to a dualist perspective):
The term ‘‘subject/object dualism’’ refers to the separation of the observer (sub-
ject/knower) and the observed object (or that which is being researched). In a dualist
perspective the observer is somehow independent of the observed, standing outside
of it, so she does not influence it in any way. (2000, p, 42)
He states that a dualism that sees a separation of observer and observed is regarded as
problematic by systems thinkers (and certainly, by systemic thinkers). He argues that in a
systemic (anti-reductionist) perspective, ‘‘everything can be seen as interacting with ev-
erything else (and boundaries are constructs allowing the inclusion and exclusion of ele-
ments in analysis, rather than being real markers of systemic closure)’’ (2000, p. 42, my
italics). This means that the observer will always be connected with the observed (as they
are all part of a system where parts can never be separated). He argues that quantum theory
in the natural sciences also ‘‘challenges the conventional separation between the observer
and observed by demonstrating that the former cannot help but influence the latter’’ (2000,
p. 43). In this respect see Davis (1997) and Romm’s discussion hereof (2002).5 Bausch and
Flanagan (2013, p. 420), citing De Zeeuw (1996), spell out further the (constructivist as
well as transformative) implications of seeing ‘‘observations’’ as ‘‘observer dependent’’.
They indicate that for De Zeeuw, the aim of knowers then is to explicitly develop con-
structed objects ‘‘which will be useful’’ for furthering action (in this case action for both
social and ecological improvement).6
5 In relation to natural scientific inquiry, Davis argues (following Wheeler, 1982) that we can be said to be
living in an ‘‘observer participatory universe’’, in which ‘‘we are the ones who … first establish the iron
posts of observation and then weave the brilliant tapestry of reality between them’’ (Davis, 1997, p. 277).
Drawing on a range of examples, he shows how the world can manifest itself in alternative ways, depending
on how we weave the tapestry.
6 They argue that it is with this understanding of the relationship between observer and observed that
Christakis and Warfield (also influenced by authors such as Ozbekhan and Churchman) developed a
‘‘systems approach for influencing the stream of world events’’ (2013, p. 425). See also Christakis’s (2004),
Christakis and Bausch’s (2006), and Bausch and Flanagan and Christakis’s (2010) discussions of structured
dialogical processes for furthering this aim.
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Midgley argues that the ‘‘problem is that subject/object dualism is so ingrained in
Western thought that it is very difficult to even identify in some instances, let alone
challenge it’’ (2000, p. 44). This is indeed the argument too of authors wishing to revitalize
Indigenous research methodologies (and ways of knowing) by focusing on Indigenous
views of systems (cf. Chilisa, 2012; Dillard, 2006; Goduka, 2012; Harris and Wasilewski,
2004; Murove, 2005; Kovach, 2009; Smith, 1999). I would suggest that Mertens’ axio-
logical tenet of the transformative paradigm could be strengthened by suggesting that just
because we always have an impact on the realities that we ‘‘observe’’ (even though we
cannot specify exactly what this is) it is required of researchers (those involved in in-
quiries) to engage with others in considering potential impacts, with the hope of generating
justifiable impacts. Our responsibilities arise because research makes, rather than finds
realities.
In other words, that there is no purpose in positing that ‘‘there is one reality’’ (as
Mertens, 2010b posits). Rather, one should lay the emphasis on Mertens’ proposal in her
article (2007a) where she suggests that reality statements that arguably hold (most) po-
tential for generating action toward increased justice should be the focus of the trans-
formative researcher. This way of looking at reality statements (or visions of reality)
invokes what Kvale sees as an extended pragmatic epistemology. Kvale spells out the
principles of such an approach to ‘‘truth’’: A pragmatic approach implies that truth (ways
of bringing forth worlds) ‘‘is whatever assists us to take actions that produce the desired
results. Deciding what are the desired results involves value and ethics’’ (2002, p. 302).
When research is directed by the quest to arouse transformative action, then one would
prioritize the criterion of catalytic validity as a way of justifying the research endeavor (as
indeed also referred to by Mertens when she speaks about catalytic authenticity, 2004,
p. 109).7 Chilisa also speaks about catalytic and tactical authenticities as strategic orien-
tations that might be adopted by researchers, where research is designed so as to maximize
possibilities for prompting/inspiring action (2012, p. 172). In terms of this (epistemological
and axiological) orientation, research is not directed towards trying to prove visions (ap-
proximately) ‘‘true’’ or ‘‘false’’, but more towards defining, with others, potential for social
and environmental justice. As noted above, Mertens focuses more on social justice while
other authors—especially Indigenous-oriented and inspired authors—stress in addition
ecological justice as of prime concern. Indigenous authors also focus more clearly on the
(systemic) idea that we all participate in ‘‘the whole’’, and that ‘‘all is connected’’ in the
web of life.
Some Indigenous Understandings of Connectivity
In this section I attempt to offer some Indigenous understandings of connectedness/rela-
tionality, while recognizing that to speak of Indigeneity is not to suggest that the
Indigenous ideas referred to are either uniform (for Indigenous people across the globe) or
static. In this regard I follow Smith who, writing from a Maori standpoint, argues that
Indigenous people can be said to be in a process of ‘‘writing or engaging with theories and
7 Lather (1986) is well-known for using the term catalytic validity as one way of defining how research
processes can attain validity other than through the search for ‘‘truth’’ as representation of some posited
realities). She argues that research can never be a ‘‘pure’’ description/explanation, purified of researchers’
concerns (1986:64). Furthermore, it is never neutral in its social consequences. She points to the importance
of recognizing ‘‘the reality-altering impact’’ of the research process (1986, p. 67).
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accounts of what it means to be Indigenous’’ (1999, p. 154). While acknowledging the
diversity within meanings of Indigeneity, Smith points out that a ‘‘common’’ thread that
Indigenous authors stress, is the ‘‘importance of making connections and affirming con-
nectedness …. Connectedness positions individuals in sets of relationships with other
people and with the environment’’ (1999, p. 148). Smith indicates some implications
hereof for practising ‘‘decolonizing methodologies’’.
Following up on this, in her book on Indigenous research methodologies Chilisa (2012)
explains the qualities of relationality in respect to ontology, epistemology and axiology.
Like Smith, she indicates that ‘‘postcolonial Indigenous research paradigms’’ offer a way
of conceptualizing the web of relations in which we can be said to be enmeshed.. Chilisa
explains that a relational ontology (worldview) focuses on ‘‘the web of connections of
people with each other and with living and non-living things’’ (p. 109). She notes that in
the African context the philosophy of Ubuntu (summed up in the African Adage ‘‘I am
because we are; we are because I am’’) expresses a world view of ‘‘existence in relation
and being for self-and-others’’ (p. 109). (She argues that similar adages can also be found,
for example, in Maori expressions.) In terms of research relationships with (human) par-
ticipants, she argues that this implies that ‘‘the researcher becomes part of circles of
relations that are connected to one another and to which the researcher is accountable’’ (p.
113). She also sees that we should be preserving/developing harmonious rather than ex-
ploitative relationships with non-living things (e.g. via ecologically sensitive thinking and
practice). She sums up this systemic worldview: ‘‘people … are embedded in a web of
relations and interconnectedness that extends to nonliving things. Understanding this type
of reality requires a back and forth movement that connects to this web of relations’’ (2012,
p. 186). The ‘‘reality’’ that Chilisa posits is thus a worldview where all things including
knowers/people as part of the web, are seen as inextricably connected.
Along with her elaboration of a relational ontology, Chilisa points to the implications of
upholding a relational epistemology (understanding of knowing). She cites Thayer-Ba-
con’s criticism of Euro-Western theories of knowledge, which are for the most part focused
on how individuals come to ‘‘know’’ (2003, p. 9, my italics). She notes that more important
within Indigenous knowledge systems is the recognition that ‘‘knowing is something that is
socially constructed by people who have relationships and connections with each other, the
living and the nonliving and the environment’’ (p. 116, my italics).8 She here takes a social
constructivist view, where it is held that people jointly construct ways of seeing and being
in relationship with one another and in recognition of their connectedness with one another
and ‘‘the environment’’. Goduka makes a similar point when she argues that while Wes-
tern-oriented epistemologies may be inclined to devalue communal modes of thinking,
what is specific about indigenous modes of knowing is that they are intentionally com-
munally oriented. As she explains: ‘‘Communal knowledge ensures that knowledge is not
collected and stored for personal power and ownership by individual specialists, but is
rather developed, retained and shared within indigenous groups for the benefit of the whole
group’’ (p. 5). This of course implies a view of ethics, namely a relational ethic.
Chilisa describes the ethical stance embedded in a relational axiology by suggesting
that in terms of a relational axiology, research should be guided by ‘‘the principles of
accountable responsibility, respectful representation, reciprocal appropriation, and rights’’
8 This understanding of the way in which social meanings are constructed is congruent with the trusting
constructivist position as spelled out by Romm (2001a, 2002, 2010). It is also consistent with Lincoln and
Guba’s point that ‘‘the meanings we associate with any … tangible reality [as we experience it] or social
interaction … determines how we respond’’ (2012, p. 12).
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(2012, p. 117). That is, a relational axiology expects that researchers will recognize their
accountabilities and their responsibilities (in the light of their necessary impact on social
life and on living and non-living things) and will inform their research accordingly. Chilisa
indicates that for her, as for other Indigenous authors, this implies a participatory ap-
proach—in which participants (especially marginalized ones) are part of the research at all
stages hereof. This means that they participate in the framing of research questions, in the
choice and use of methods, in the way that ‘‘findings’’ are drafted and discussed, and in the
way that meetings are held with audiences to review the findings and their import. These
recommendations for participatory research are similar to the ones put forward by Mertens
when she discusses the methodological tenets of the transformative paradigm:
The transformative methodological belief system supports the use of a cyclical
model in which community members are brought into the research process from the
beginning and throughout the process in a variety of roles (2010b, p. 472)
Mertens recommends that the various roles adopted by initiating ‘‘researchers’’ and
‘‘community members’’ (who become part of the research) are to be negotiated between
the parties. Mertens underlines that part of the cycle of transformative research is that the
various people (researchers/co-researchers/research participants) actively seek options for
‘‘social change’’ (2010b, p. 473). She notes that when research work proceeds in this
manner, then researchers can be said to be operating in a transformative spirit even if they
do not explicitly label their work by placing it in the transformative paradigm. She also
makes the point (including with reference to Chilisa, whose various works she cites) that
‘‘indigenous peoples and scholars from marginalized communities have much to teach us
about respect for culture and the generation of knowledge for social change’’ (p. 474).
Cram et al. (2013) in their introduction to the edited book Indigenous Pathways into
Social Research explain that the emphasis on relational constructs within a postcolonial
indigenous research paradigm ‘‘emanates from Indigenous value systems that recognize the
connections between people, past, present, and future, and all living and non-living things’’
(p. 16). They go on to state that ‘‘connectivity is important for the ethical basis it provides
for making decisions about research’’ (p. 16). They point out that protocols developed by
indigenous researchers in various parts of the globe have ‘‘seen the growth of indigenous-
informed (and culturally responsive) participatory research methodologies’’ (p. 18). They
cite the ‘‘growth of community-based participatory research in the United States and
participatory action research in other parts of the world’’ that is inspired by Indigenous
worldviews/paradigms (2013, p. 18). What is emphasized here is that the notion (and
experience of) connectivity forms a basis for recognizing that in whatever way people
proceed as a researchers/inquirers, the inquiry itself will serve to influence the patterning of
social life; it is this recognition that, as Chilisa puts it (2012, p. 13) ‘‘invites researchers to
interrogate their roles and responsibilities as researchers’’. And as Kovach stresses, this
interrogation can serve to prompt researchers steeped in Western traditions ‘‘to engage in
reflexive self-study, to consider a research paradigm outside the Western tradition that
offers a systemic approach to understanding [and being in] the world’’ (2009. p. 29).
Similarly to Cram et al., Kovach notes that within qualitative inquiries in the par-
ticipatory tradition (such as in participatory action research) there are already ‘‘allies for
Indigenous researchers’’, especially insofar as such research is directed towards ‘‘giving
back to a community through research as praxis’’ (2009, p. 27). But Kovach argues that
there is still room for strengthening the idea of ‘‘self-in-relation’’ (a translation of the Cree
word nisitohtamowin’’ (2009, p. 27) as manifested in research practice.
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I now proceed to show links between these) arguments and various notions of par-
ticipatory action or active research.
Action, Action-Oriented and Active research
In this section I show how Flood unites systemic thinking with intervention/action research
and how this can be said to offer a broader definition of AR than is normally understood in
the traditional action research cycle. I indicate that systemic ‘‘action research’’ or ‘‘action-
oriented’’ research indeed connects with Cram, Chilisa and Mertens’ account of Indigenous
protocols for doing research which ‘‘stress the importance of principles such as respect and
reciprocity, the importance of elders, and cultural and spiritual protocols’’ (2013, p. 18). I
show too how this can be seen as related to Mertens’ conception of involving research
participants in various ways and in various stages of the research. I point out that terms
such as action-oriented or active allow for researchers (with participants) to operate
broadly with an understanding that research is always connected to social and ecological
outcomes. This creates a basis for choosing with participants’ ways of proceeding and
ways of making research ‘‘useful’’. Space in this article does not afford a full discussion
hereof, so I offer only some pointers.
In the course of deliberating around the relationship of systems thinking to action
research Flood makes the point (along with others) that the term systemic is preferable to
systems in that the focus is on operating with an appreciation that the social construction of
the world (of which we are part rather than apart) is systemic (2001, p. 133). Flood refers
to complexity theory (a type of systemic thinking) which, he notes, ‘‘explains that the
vastness of interrelationships and emergence in which people are immersed is beyond our
ability to establish full comprehension’’ (2001, p. 140). He remarks that one of the im-
plications of this is that ‘‘human understanding will always be enveloped in mystery’’. Far
from seeing this as problematic, Flood proposes that ‘‘once this idea is grasped, a systemic
appreciation of spiritualism then envelops the entire human experience and consequently
everything that happens within that experience, including action research’’ (2001, p. 141).
Flood criticizes a reductionist-oriented science, which fragments the world ‘‘and alienates
so called parts, for example you and me from patterns and rhythms of life in which we
participate’’ (2001, p. 142). He prefers the spiritual quality of a ‘‘deep systemic view that
pictures each person’s life as a flash of consciousness, in existence and of existence’’
(2001, p. 142). He states that such a view leads to a perception of wholeness, not of
individuals and objects’’ (2001, p. 142). He argues that a systemic view understood in this
way, ‘‘is not an approach to action research, but a grounding for action research that may
broaden action and deepen research’’ (2001, p. 143).
That is, if ‘‘action research’’ is adopted with a systemic understanding as basis, then
‘‘actions’’ are broadened as participants recognize their interconnectedness with the
mysterious whole and recognize (on a spiritual level) that what they do to others (living
and non-living) will not be without consequences for them (and for others). Nonetheless,
operating in terms of a systemic view does not imply that all participative research/inquiry
need follow the traditional action research cycle of developing plans, acting, observing,
and reflecting on consequences (cf. Dick, 2014). It can imply a variety of ways of prac-
ticing a participatory approach (as proposed by, for example, McKay and Romm, 2008).
Romm (2014) spells out this argument when she speaks of ‘‘active and accountable in-
quiry’’, where ‘‘activity’’ can take a variety of forms on the parts of ‘‘researchers’’ and
‘‘research participants’’—depending on how their various roles are envisaged. This clearly
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resonates with Chilisa’s point that what is important is that ‘‘researchers interrogate their
roles and responsibilities’’ (2012, p. 13).
Permeability of Paradigms and Creating Space for Additions
To conclude this article I wish to offer some considerations around the ‘‘big four’’ para-
digms as well as the additions of ‘‘new’’ alternatives (that are new to Western-oriented
typologies). As indicated in my Introduction, Mackenzie and Knipe (2006) offer a pre-
sentation of the four paradigms (postpositivist, constructivist, transformative and prag-
matic) that have served as a reference point for a myriad of discussions around paradigms
in the research literature.
I have focused in this article on the transformative paradigm and shown how it bears a
close relationship to, but at the same time can be strengthened in terms of, a ‘‘commu-
nication’’ with a critical systemic approach and also with postcolonial Indigenous para-
digms. In her discussion of characteristics, conversations and contexts of Indigenous
methodologies, Kovach accepts that the four-paradigmed rubric supplied by Mertens offers
an inclusive space, which also accommodates Indigenous research practices (2009, p. 27).
Nevertheless, Chilisa (and others), in speaking about postcolonial paradigms, seem to be
wary of typologies which do not give sufficient recognition to the distinctiveness of these
alternative ‘‘pathways to research’’. Dillard expresses her reservations (as an African
American woman) regarding her approach being subsumed under the ‘‘big four’’. She
indicates that she wishes to embrace a paradigm that ‘‘resonates with my very spirit and
provides some congruence and support for the work that I do, as an African-American
woman scholar’’ (2006, p. 65). She continues:
Rather than subvert the Big Four (or worse yet, create a replicated ‘‘sub-version’’ of
the same), I seek to embrace and create a paradigm that embodies and articulates a
coherent sense of life around me, as an African-American woman. (2006, p. 65)
When explicating the transformative paradigm, Mertens cites Indigenous authors’ work
as fitting in with, and contributing to, the transformative paradigm. But Dillard (and many
Indigenous researchers) prefer to add additionals to the ‘‘big four’’ so that their positions
(including their specific understandings of spirituality and what it means to do research
with a spiritual focus) are not subsumed under one of these four, which are still seen as
overly Western-oriented. Koitsiwe, writing from the context of South Africa, too suggests
that ‘‘a new paradigm and epistemology in research is important because the global
knowledge economy is based on new and diverse ways of generating and developing
knowledge for sustainable livelihoods’’ (2013, p. 274). Furthermore, Wilson and Wilson,
both from the Opaskwayak Cree Nation in Canada, indicate that ‘‘the highlight of our
careers was to finally realize an initiative that reflected an Indigenous paradigm; one that
honored relationships in all their many forms’’ (2013, p. 340). The inclusion of Indigenous
paradigms in typologies about paradigms could create a space for further conversation
between the big four and additional pathways, and would at least not subsume them within
the transformative paradigm (unless proponents of ‘‘new pathways to research’’ are
comfortable with this).
As far as boundaries between positions are concerned, I have noted in the article that
while Mertens wishes to distinguish the transformative paradigm from, say, postpositivism
and constructivism, she also recognizes that boundaries between paradigms may be per-
meable. This is especially insofar as proponents exhibit a propensity to communicate and
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learn from one another. I have shown, for instance, that the transformative paradigm may
benefit from appreciating the constructivist insistence that all that researchers can ever
‘‘find’’ are ways of constructing visions of realities. And constructivist-oriented authors can
benefit from the axiological tenet that Mertens offers as a basis for deciding to which
constructions researchers should feel allegiance to give more ‘‘voice’’. Meanwhile, Scott
attempts to open a space for postpositivist-inclined researchers to communicate with more
constructivist-oriented ones when she notes that:
There are very few adherents to epistemologies of objective knowledge. Quantitative
researchers are not naı¨ve positivists. They acknowledge the role of social con-
struction in measures and are wary of quantification being seen as the equivalent of
scientific reasoning. They know better than most that ‘‘statistics can lie. (2010,
p. 233)
Once postpositivist-inclined authors adopt this position, there is room for further dis-
cussion around the tenets and application of tenets of postpositivist- and constructivist-
oriented paradigms (see also Romm, 2013). This would also concur with Smith’s sug-
gestion (1999, p. 137) that although positivism normally implies a view of researchers as
‘‘outsiders’’ who are not ‘‘implicated in the research scene’’, positivist-oriented researchers
(examining variables) can blur the lines between apparently objective outsider research
(where researchers assume a distance from the community) and insider research (where
relationships with communities are intentionally built). In an Indigenous research agenda it
is understood that involving members of communities in defining ‘‘measures’’ and in the
analysis of results (rather than seeing results as objective displays of information) adds to
the quality of the research process. What is important, she maintains, is that researchers
learn the skills and reflexivities required to mediate and work with these insider/outsider
dynamics (as she believes Indigenous research is especially geared to handle). In short, I
suggest that appreciating ‘‘new’’ paradigms (new to Western-oriented typologies) without
subsuming them under the ‘‘big four’’ is possible, as well as learning across (defined)
boundaries, to enrich all our pathways into the variety of ways of responsibly practicing
social research.
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